2 http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/wikipedia.org?range=5y&size=large&y=t (Feb 6, 2014). 3 https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/List_of_Wikipedias (Aug 14, 2014). 4 See, for instance, Soetevent (2005) on the role of anonymity in giving. 5 Other well-known examples of online public goods are summarized in Zhu (2011, 1601), including products emanating from open source software development (e.g. Mozilla Firefox, Linux) and content sharing platforms (e.g. YouTube). The existing literature is largely silent on the effects and potential of nonmonetary rewards, in particular awards, for pro-social behavior. However, it can be observed that throughout history, the provision of honor to volunteers, for instance with orders of merit, has played an important role in most--if not There are nowadays plenty of honors given for pro-social behavior, ranging from the prestigious Florence Nightingale Medal of the International
devoted to the motivations underlying such pro-social behavior (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 2002 , Cooper and Kagel 2013 . 6 This paper focuses on a different but related question, namely how to foster and uphold the behavior already undertaken by individuals. Voluntary commitments have become increasingly fleeting because fewer and fewer volunteers are willing or able to commit to an organization for an extended period of time (Macduff 2005) . Nonprofit organizations, however, are dependent on sustained involvement of volunteers (see, e.g., Snyder and Omoto 2008) . Even a project such as Wikipedia, which has seen millions of people contribute, is severely threatened by declining retention rates among its newer members (Wikimedia 2011a) .
Voluntary organizations are confronted with the challenge of fostering the behavior of their members without, however, crowding out their intrinsic motivation with the rewards they choose to employ (see Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011 for a discussion of when incentives do and do not work to motivate pro-social behavior). These organizations have to strike a delicate balance between the nature and salience of the rewards, and the selfdeterminedness and self-perception of volunteers (Frey and Goette 1999 , Falk and Kosfeld 2006 , Tirole and Bénabou 2006 , Ariely, Bracha, and Meier 2009 . Voluntary organizations can neither recur to monetary incentives as for-profit firms do to incentivize their employees, nor can they bind their members with contractual agreements. Non-monetary alternatives have to be employed to motivate volunteers to stay.
The existing literature is largely silent on the effects and potential of nonmonetary rewards, in particular awards, for pro-social behavior. However, it can be observed that throughout history, the provision of honor to volunteers, for instance with orders of merit, has played an important role in most--if not
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6 Studies focusing on motivations to contribute to online public goods (many of which focus on open source software development) are, for example, Lerner and Tirole (2002) , Ciffolilli (2003) , Lakhani and von Hippel (2003) , Lakhani and Wolf (2005) , Nov (2007) , and Schroer and Hertel (2009). all--societies (Frey and Neckermann 2009) . Awards provide the possibility to "repay" volunteers in a non-monetary currency that may cater to their initial motivations (e.g., honor) while reducing the risk of crowding-out. Whereas states have retained the monopoly over official orders (e.g., the President's Volunteer Service Award in the US), non-state entities have created other forms of awards (e.g., journals bestowing service awards to a select group of Associate Editors and reviewers to recognize their voluntary contributions).
There are nowadays plenty of honors given for pro-social behavior, ranging The analysis of the potential of awards in furthering the provision of public goods is confronted with a major obstacle. Since awards are by definition always given for extraordinary behavior, causality cannot be established.
Omitted variables and endogeneity bias cannot be ruled out. As it is "the best" who are awarded, it is not surprising that award recipients also perform better than other persons in the future. Such superior performance may simply reflect the fact that award winners are more able and more motivated than nonwinners. Observing superior performance of award recipients thus does not establish whether the award conferral as such raises subsequent performance.
Various methods can help identify an award's causal effects. One is to compare the performance of award winners with that of a closely comparable group, in particular, with the set of award nominees Singh 2001a,b, Ginsburgh 2003) . It is also possible to construct a comparison group using the synthetic control method (Chan et al. 2014) , or to perform a difference-in-differences analysis where awards are given for a task uncorrelated with the outcome measure of performance (Neckermann, Cueni, and Frey 2014 ).
An ideal identification strategy uses randomization in a natural field environment (e.g., Gneezy and List 2006 and Kube, Maréchal, and Puppe ! 5 2012 testing gift-exchange in the field, and Chen et al. 2010 analyzing the effect of personalized social information in an online community). This method has been approximated by an experiment where students were hired for a one-time data entry job of two hours and subjects in the award treatment were promised a symbolic congratulatory card in addition to the fixed wage (Kosfeld and Neckermann 2011) . Notwithstanding these recent advances in the literature on awards, 7 however, various limitations remain. In some cases the identification of a causal relationship remains uncertain (internal validity);
in other cases the setting is artificial and focuses on a short time window, so that external validity and especially the extension to pro-social behavior are doubtful. True randomization is difficult to institute in the field because award-giving institutions are reluctant to relinquish control of the selection process.
To circumvent this problem, a new award scheme can be implemented, with a committee of senior practitioners to establish the award's reputation. The latter approach was chosen for this experiment. Each month, a fixed number of individuals are randomly allocated into the treatment group. An award is posted on their personal page and their name is announced on the official award page, embedded in a national Wikipedia portal. The experimental design based on a random treatment allocation allows for a straightforward identification of causality by basic mean-comparison tests.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper presents the first natural field experiment using randomization to identify the causal effects of awards on voluntary contributions to a public good. In particular, I examine two questions. The first is whether awards that are purely symbolic and of no present or future material value can motivate new contributors to uphold their engagement, thus increasing newcomer retention. The second question to be analyzed is whether awards have a motivational effect that extends beyond the
Other economic analyses of awards include the early work by Hansen and Weisbrod (1972) , as well as Frey (2005) , Malmendier and Tate (2009), and Siming (2012) .
enhanced social reputation (public image) they usually entail. Since only the award recipients know that they are the individuals behind the pseudonyms that were awarded, the experimental context makes it possible to exclude subjects' public identity (e.g., social esteem, real-life reputation and status). I exploit this setup to identify whether awards also have an impact on individuals' intrinsic, private identity.
The experiment is conducted at the German language edition of Wikipedia, which is the second-oldest one after the English Wikipedia and ranks among the largest Wikipedia language versions 8 in terms of article numbers (more than 1.5 million as of May 2013 9 ), contributors (more than 1.6 million registered accounts 10 ) and usage (over 1.2 million views per hour 10 ). The experiment spans more than eight months and comprises observations on 3,066 individuals. With its focus on newcomer retention, the study addresses one of the most important challenges Wikipedia faces; for although its readership has been increasing steadily (Greenstein and Zhu 2012) , Wikipedia is struggling with declining retention rates among its contributors, especially among new ones (Suh et al. 2009 , Wikimedia 2011a , Halfaker et al. 2013 ).
The field experiment provides empirical evidence that awards do indeed increase retention among newcomers by motivating them to uphold their contributions to a public good such as Wikipedia. Activity is considered in three fundamental dimensions: General activity, direct work on articles, and behind-the-scenes coordination work. In all three cases, the positive effect of the award is not only statistically significant; it is also sizeable and of practical importance given the retention problem Wikipedia and other volunteer organizations face.
The two key findings derived from the analysis are, first, that awards positively impact individual behavior even if they cannot entail any material . Today, newcomers are more likely to be greeted with a warning rather than a welcome message (Pinchuk 2011 , Halfaker 2012 , harsh criticism being no exception (Kraut et al. 2012) . While reverts (deletions) help preserve quality, they substantially decrease newcomers'
Collaborations between Wikipedia and prestigious research and state entities are no exception (Butler 2008 (Suh et al. 2009 , Wikimedia Deutschland 2011 , Jensen 2012 List and Rasul (2010, 105) . The present study lends support to this assertion and moreover emphasizes that practitioners' endorsement is most likely to be vital for any such endeavor.
The backing and trust of several highly reputable community members stands at the heart of this experiment. These contacts were established via telephone calls, which were followed up by regular roundtable meetings with a group of editors willing to tackle the retention problem with the help of the experiment.
They became official founding members of the project, which was thus established under the umbrella of the Swiss national portal, 13 providing the awards with considerable repute and an official character. Given the high involvement of Wikipedians from the beginning on, the project did not have to be declared an experiment and could thus preserve the advantages of a natural field experiment (Harrison and List 2004) , i.e. that subjects remain in their natural environment and that their behavior is not distorted by their being aware of the experiment.
The experiment proceeds in four steps (see Table A1 in the Online Appendix). First, on the 6th of every month, I obtain a data dump of the Second, the remaining editors (ca. 500) are examined one by one to exclude vandals, advertisers, secondary accounts ("sockpuppets"), group accounts (including those created by organizations) and accounts of Wikimedia employees according to a rulebook developed for this purpose. 17 For this step, an algorithm was developed that flags an editor if specific keywords are found on his or her user page. Only editors are retained who have made at least one contribution to an article that is still visible at the day of the screening, i.e. that
has not been deleted, whereby only articles are considered that are not tagged for deletion (as, e.g., in Zhu et al. 2013) .
From the pool of remaining editors (ca. 380), 150 award recipients are randomly selected (treatment group). In a fourth and last step, on the morning of the 12th of the given month, the list of winners is posted on the award's page and a text accompanied by a graphic award is placed on the respective editor's talk page (see Online Appendix B). 15 editors (1 percent) from the treatment group and 28 editors (1 percent) from the control group have been blocked or deleted after the awarding date and are therefore not included in the data set. Treatment and control groups thus comprise 1,185 and 1,881 editors, respectively (see Table A1 in the Online Appendix for a break-up).
Wikipedia keeps the history of every edit made by each contributor, including the timestamps. This allows me to observe the entire range of activities that contributors engage in (e.g., correcting or writing articles, uploading files), including the correspondence among editors on talk pages.
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Thus, the accurateness of the performance measurement is close to that in lab experiments, but the scope of action is not artificially imposed and even social interaction is allowed for and taken into account. At the same time, the Internet context makes it possible to treat each award recipient equally, whereas face-to-face interactions could be subject to variability of emotional expressions and inadvertent signaling by the researcher.
C. Relevant Outcome Variables
The dependent variable of interest is retention, i.e., whether a newcomer becomes active again in the month following the awarding date--the "original definition of activity" being that at least one edit be made in a given month (Wikimedia 2011a, 11) . As stated on the Wikimedia research pages,
metric has commonly been used (...) when examining the "decline" of participation". 19 As a robustness check, the general notion of activity can be further restricted, ignoring contributions to the project's page and to the editor's own pages so as to make sure that the results are not merely driven by verbal reactions to the award.
Retention can also be more narrowly conceived of. The most conservative measure of retention would exclusively consider article edits as a form of direct content provision, ignoring all other activities (as, e.g., coordination work or file uploads). A binary variable indicates the shares of the treatment and control groups that remain active in this work dimension.
Several studies have also shown the "critical importance of coordination" for online production environments such as Wikipedia (Kittur and Kraut 2008, 37) . Coordination is achieved by "indirect work (...) such as conflict resolution, consensus building, or community management" (Kittur et al. 2007, 3) . Thus, participation in discussions is another important measure (see, e.g., Panciera, Halfaker, and Terveen (2009); Wöhner, Köhler, and Peters (2011) include it in their reputation measure). As awards are social rewards, the study will assess whether they do indeed encourage more newcomers to develop a "community sense" (Wikimedia 2012) . To operationalize the measurement of an editor's interaction with the community, the variable "active on talk pages" assesses whether the editor has made any contributions to the different talk pages in Wikipedia. Two other variables measure whether the newcomer has edited his or her own "user page", which is most often employed to introduce oneself to the community, or the personal "user talk page", which is usually used to respond to other editors' requests.
To assure that any treatment effect found (i.e., a higher retention rate among subjects from the treatment group) is not driven by minor editing activities, the degree of activity is considered as an extension. The Wikimedia research team has developed a categorization of activity levels that can be used to see whether the award also produces editors who are more active in providing content to articles than are subjects in the control group. Authors are divided into four groups according to the number of article edits they make in the following month: Those who become inactive, those making 1 to 4 article edits, "active" editors (5-99 edits), and "very active" editors (100+ edits).
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Since the field experiment focuses on newcomer retention, further performance measures are consciously avoided. In particular, the number of article edits as such is not used as a variable for the analysis, despite its favorable property of being continuous. The measure has several pitfalls (see, e.g., Adler et al. 2008) . Most importantly, the experimental treatment may introduce an asymmetry between treatment and control groups that inhibits the use of this measure for the analysis. A person can prepare a whole article and put it on Wikipedia in one edit, while another person may correct minor mistakes in an article and save each single change, thus generating many more edits. Each time the save button is hit, one edit is registered. If the distortions of the edit count measure were distributed equally among treatment and control groups, the measure would be flawed but the comparative analysis could still be revealing. However, receiving an award may prompt newcomers to read and abide by the community conventions, which ask each editor to reduce the number of edits made to a single article by collecting and previewing all the changes before saving them. 21 Thus, the award may in fact lead to a decline in the number of edits made by award recipients. The analysis' focus on retention (both broadly and narrowly defined) allows circumventing the problems related to performance measurement. 
II. Theoretical Background and Predictions
Awards such as medals of merit or badges of honor are extrinsic, nonmonetary motivators. In the terminology of Bénabou and Tirole (2003: 504) , these awards correspond to "discretionary" or "ex post" rewards, as opposed to "promised" or "ex ante" contingent incentives (e.g., prize contests, as studied Else, as some observers contend, awards are often "just pieces of ribbon" (Besley 2005) . In this experiment, not even ribbons are used; the award is just a graphic digital symbol. And yet, awards may be valued by their recipients because they publicly confer others' esteem. The following proposition is therefore set forth:
P1. An award can be an effective motivator (increasing retention) even when carrying no material value, i.e., having no career-related implications and involving no prize money or regular pay that the award could add meaning to.
The randomized treatment allocation and the anonymous context of Wikipedia, devoid of monetary payments and excluding career-related implications, provide a unique setting for examining whether awards have a causal impact even when no material benefits may ensue. To test the prediction, the analysis considers whether subjects subsequently become active again. It looks at general activity, but also more narrowly at direct contributions to articles only.
The experiment goes further and exploits the anonymous setting of
Wikipedia to analyze the relation between awards and identity. Drawing on literature from different fields, mainly from psychology and identity economics Kranton 2000, 2005) , the study distinguishes two types of identity: public identity, which relates to a natural person's public image (Jenkins 2000) and is implicated in face-to-face interactions, and private identity, involving a person's sense of self (Loewenstein 1999) , selfimage (Lea and Webley 1997, Bénabou and Tirole 2011) , self-esteem (Pyszczynski et al. 2004, Kuhnen and Tymula 2012) , and self-concept (Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008) . Private identity is intrinsic while public identity is directly related to the extrinsic status and reputation concerns of individuals (Huberman, Loch, and Önçüler 2004 , Auriol and Renault 2008 , Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008 , Bénabou and Tirole 2009 ). Related to the distinction between private and public identity are the distinctions between private and public selves (Goffman 1959 , Schlenker 1986 ), between self-signaling and social signaling (Gneezy et al. 2012) , and between self-reputation and social reputational concerns (Bénabou and Tirole 2009, 462 Since awards are usually publicly bestowed in face-to-face interactions, it is difficult to examine whether they merely enhance the recipients' public identity, or whether they also affect their private identity. The experimental setup has two particular properties that, combined, shield individuals' public identity. First, in the anonymous context of Wikipedia, only the award recipients themselves know that they are the ones who have been publicly honored. The use of online pseudonyms keeps the individuals' e-reputation separated from their real-life reputation. 22 Yet, individuals may have invested heavily in their e-reputation, so that they identify with it just as others do with their natural, real-life identity. This is why the second property of the setup is To test proposition P2, the award's effect on the newcomers' engagement with the community will be considered--besides general activity and direct work on articles. If the award prompts its recipients to identify themselves as members of the community of Wikipedians, they are not only more likely to
become active again and edit articles; they are also more likely to engage in discussions and behind-the-scenes coordination work where they interact with other community members.
There is one study whose results could be interpreted in the light of proposition P2, suggesting that awards could indeed have an impact on behavior even when restricted to individuals' private identity. Restivo and van de Rijt (2012) conducted a randomized field experiment at the English Wikipedia, showing that receiving an award (called "barnstar") from another editor has a significant effect, increasing productivity (i.e., article editing activity) by 60%. Since the setting of the experiment is Wikipedia, public identity is shielded off. However, only a very small share of Wikipedia editors is considered, namely the 1% most productive contributors, who have moreover never before received an award. Given that barnstars are frequent in the English Wikipedia (see the article on "Wikipedia:Barnstaritis"), never having received one although being highly active can be particularly frustrating. The considerable treatment effect the authors find may in part be due to the particular sample of highly active contributors who finally receive their long-awaited recognition.
In contrast, the present field experiment studies newcomers who have just created their pseudonym and are not necessarily among the top performers.
Many of them are not even aware that awards exist in Wikipedia. If an award changes these individuals' behavior, it is because it has introduced Wikipedia as an argument in their private identity and utility function. Moreover, this experiment also allows considering interaction with others as a proxy for selfidentification with the community.
In sum, the present field experiment adds insights to the literature on motivation and rewards in that (i) it is able to establish the causal effect of awards on individual behavior (i.e., retention); (ii) monetary and career related benefits from receiving the award are ruled out; (iii) the effect on recipients'
private identity (self-image, self-esteem) can be examined because the use of only recently adopted pseudonyms keeps their public identity (public image, reputation) unchanged.
Moreover, this is the first field experiment the author is aware of, which mirrors award schemes as they can often be observed in practice, with regular monthly intervals and a fixed number of recipients. A proper award jury has been established, where senior editors lend their reputation to the award in the name of a national portal. 24 Together with the hall of fame-like award pages, this gives the award an official nature. The existing studies on awards mostly consider one-time interventions, not veritable award schemes put in place for a long time horizon. Other studies, in particular the few that look at Wikipedia barnstars, are moreover limited to horizontal award bestowals, where one peer
gives an award to another, making the transaction similar to gift giving. The implications for reciprocation are vastly different . In the latter case, the award recipient may reciprocate by giving back a gift (or barnstar). In the former case, as in this experiment, where giver and recipient are on opposite ends of a vertical hierarchy, the recipient cannot reciprocate by bestowing an award upon the giver. The possibilities for reciprocation are channeled towards conforming to the giver's expectations, e.g., by continuing to edit Wikipedia.
III. Empirical Analysis

A. Randomization
Randomly bestowing awards at first sight seems to be an impossible task because awards are designed to be given to the persons excelling in their tasks.
However, the experiment shows that it can succeed if two important conditions are fulfilled. Firstly, a basic pre-selection has to exclude obviously undeserving candidates, like vandals (see also, e.g., Glewwe, Kremer, and Moulin (2009) , who randomly attributed treatment to 25 schools from a list of 100 deserving schools). Secondly, subjects who--by chance--do not receive the award should be an unidentifiable group who are ideally ignorant of the award's existence. This is why the higher levels of the award could not be randomly bestowed. Non-receipt of the second-level award risks being demotivating for someone belonging to the identifiable group of winners of the first-level award who has made an effort to be honored again but fails to win. Such a decision can hardly be randomized.
Randomization has advantages going beyond the identification of a causal effect (Zeitoun, Osterloh, and Frey 2014) . Most importantly, it prevents biased decisions (e.g., based on a jury member's political hue) and discourages strategic manipulation (e.g., awards given for work on a particular issue).
Randomization allows a wider variety of subjects to be honored and to receive attention, which is in line with Wikipedia's concern for diversity.
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As a randomization check, Panel A of and Zhu 2011 and Zhu , 1609 .
25 "Wikipedia also needs more different Wikipedians [so as to] increase the quality and completeness of the encyclopedia [as well as] the likelihood that any new member of the community will find like-minded collaborators and feel like they fit in" (Morgan et al. 2013, 8) . Table A1 in the Online Appendix.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
As expected, before the intervention, the differences are all negligible, point into different directions, and are never even marginally statistically significant. 26 The binary outcome variables--whether an editor stays active at all, or on article pages only--are not included since they are per definition positive given that the pre-selection only considers newcomers who have made their first article edit in the previous month.
However, the ordinal variable based on the Wikimedia Foundation's categorization of activity levels, which will be included as an outcome
26 A power analysis indicates that even a small effect of .2 (see Cohen 1988) would be detected, if it existed, with a probability of .99991 (one-tailed) given the sample size of the two groups and an alpha error probability of .05.
variable, can be used as a further randomization check (the levels of activity being 0 article edits, 1-4 article edits, 5-99 article edits, and 100+ article edits).
A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (see Table C1 , Online Appendix C) produces statistically insignificant results (z = 1.539, Prob > |z| = 0.1239). This again confirms that assignment to treatment and control groups was random.
B. Results
The analysis considers eight awarding rounds, from September 2012 to Thanks to the random assignment of the treatment, potential confounding variables are on average distributed equally between the treatment and control whether any activity can be observed after the awarding date. Following up on Figure 1 , the first row considers the month after awarding date and shows that the difference observed in the bar chart is indeed statistically significant at the 99.9 percent level (! 2 (1) = 23.28, p = 0.000). Row 2 in Panel A (Table 2 ) extends the period of observation to the 2 months following the intervention to account for the duration of the effects.
The results in row 2 ascertain that the difference observed in row 1 is not due to a temporal substitution effect, i.e. that award recipients do not merely advance their next period of activity to the first month instead of the second after awarding date. In the Internet context, already the first 24 hours are highly predictive of an editor's future engagement, such that the eight weeks considered are a relatively long time horizon (see, e.g., Panciera, Halfaker, and Terveen 2009, Morgan et al. 2013) . Previous research on gift exchange has shown that positive effects initially found vanished after the first couple of hours (Gneezy and List 2006) . The results in row 2 show that, over the 2 months following the intervention, the retention rate in the treatment group is still 8 percentage points higher than the retention rate of 42 percent observed in the control group. This treatment effect of 19 percent is again highly statistically significant (! 2 (1) = 17.26, p = 0.000). The award's effect on retention thus persists even when the period of observation is extended.
Direct work on articles.--When restricting the definition of activity to article edits only ( Table 2 , Panel B), the share of award recipients who remain active in this dimension of work is 6 percentage points higher than the retention rate of 32 percent observed in the control group. The award's causal effect, raising the retention rate by 19 percent, is statistically significant at the 99-percent level (! 2 (1) = 9.87, p = 0.002).
In a further step, the analysis of Panel B (Table 2 ) is extended to explore whether the award also produces more highly active authors. The Wikimedia
Foundation's categorization of activity levels (focusing on article edits) is used as a basis for this part of the analysis. Figure 2 shows the distribution of subjects from the control and treatment groups in the first month after the awarding date across the different levels of article editing activity commonly considered.
As can be seen in Figure 2 , the award's effect on retention is not driven by only minor article editing activity--the share of newcomers who remain active is increased on every level of activity (right side of the dashed line). The award raises the share of editors who make between 1 and 4 article edits in the month after the awarding date by almost 14 percent (from 16.9 percent to 19.2 percent). It increases the share of editors who reach the medium level of activity (5-99 article edits) by about 18 percent (from 13.6 percent to 16 percent). The increase in the share of "very active" newcomers (100 edits and more) amounts to almost 37 percent (from 1.9 percent in the control to 2.6 percent in the treatment group). Figure 2 thus illustrates that the award not only lowers the attrition rate of new authors (as seen in Panel B of Table 2 and on the left side of the dashed line in Figure 2) ; it indeed raises the share of editors on every level of activity.
The limitations of the edit count metric have been mentioned above, but transforming the measure into an ordinal variable mitigates the distortionary tendencies and gives a useful indication that helps to ascertain that the award's effect on retention found in Panel B of Table 2 is not due to only minor article editing activity. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (see Table C2 , Online Appendix C) shows the statistical significance of the finding that the treatment group tends to have larger values than the control group (z-value = -3.192, Prob > |z| = 0.0014).
28 Mann Whitney only allows to draw conclusions about the statistical significance of the test. For the effect size, ordered logit is used. The proportional odds ratio of comparing subjects of the control group with award recipients on the level of activity is 1.098703 (Prob > |z| = 0.020), the cut-points being 1.131517, 2.023534, and 4.133395. This means that the odds of high activity (i.e., more than 4 edits) versus the combined lower categories of activity are 1.099 times greater for subjects in the treatment group. Likewise, the award doubles the share of newcomers who respond to others'
requests on their talk pages (row 2 of Panel C) and thus enter in direct contact with community members (10 percent vs. 5 percent; ! 2 (1) = 31.26, p = 0.000).
When considering interactions on talk pages more generally (thus also including, e.g., other editors' talk pages and article talk pages), the share of active editors is 8 percentage points higher in the award condition than in the control group (21 percent vs. 13 percent); the increase by 62 percent being highly statistically significant (! 2 (1) = 35.57, p = 0.000).
C. Robustness
Two further binary activity variables are created to ascertain that the difference in retention rates between treatment and control groups found in Panel A of Table 2 , which considers general editing activity (e.g., writing
articles, discussing their content, uploading files), is not merely driven by verbal responses to the award. In line with the analysis in Panel A (Table 2) , the two variables record any type of activity. However, the first alternative activity variable ignores contributions to the award project's page, and the second variable goes even further in that it also omits edits to the respective editor's own user and user talk pages. Table 2 . This suggests that award recipients who post a thank you note on the project's page also go on to make other contributions.
Additionally excluding editors' own pages somewhat reduces the effect, but still shows a difference of 7 percentage points, which is highly statistically significant (! 2 (1) = 16.41, p = 0.000). Thus, even when applying very conservative measures of activity, like that in row 2 of Table C3 or the one that only considers direct edits to articles ( Table 2 , Panel B), a causal effect of the award on retention can be established.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Whereas research on the motivations for private contributions to public goods is extensive, little is known about the rewards and incentives that help This study presents a large-scale natural field experiment where an award scheme is implemented and randomization is employed to establish clear causal effects of awards on voluntary contributions to a public good. The experiment is conducted at the German-language version of Wikipedia and explores whether awards can be used to increase newcomer retention and thereby respond to one of the online encyclopedia's biggest challenges. Even though the awards are given in an anonymous context, where no material or non-virtual benefits such as status among one's peers can arise, the award has a considerable and statistically highly significant impact on retention rates.
The findings support the proposition that even purely symbolic awards can be effective motivators. The share of newcomers who remain active in the month after the awarding date is 9 percentage points higher for the treatment group than for the control group. This is a 25 percent increase in the retention rate (p = 0.000), from a share of 35 percent to one of 44 percent, which is not driven by a temporal substitution effect or by only verbal responses to the award. When considering only direct contributions to articles, the award also increases the fraction of newcomers who remain active according to this conservative definition of work, resulting in a difference of 6 percentage points between treatment and control groups. The 19 percent increase (from 32 percent to 38 percent, p = 0.002) is not driven by minor editing activities; the award increases the shares of authors on all three commonly considered activity levels.
The proposition relating to the award's effects on recipients' private identity is also backed by the findings. First, the above-mentioned results show that even ruling out any effects on public identity (reputation, status among peers)
does not inhibit the award from positively affecting individual behavior.
Second, the award also has a substantial impact on the number of newcomers who interact with the community and engage in behind-the-scenes coordination work, suggesting that their private identity as a community member ("Wikipedian") has been strengthened. After the intervention, 8
percentage points more editors in the treatment group are active in this work dimension, a 62 percent increase from the rate of 13 percent of editors in the control group who engage in such tasks (p = 0.000). The importance of indirect work has been highlighted by several studies (Kittur and Kraut 2008 , Wöhner, Köhler, and Peters 2011 , and the social ties thus established further increase the likelihood that the respective newcomer also stays within the community (McPherson, Popielarz, and Drobnic 1992) .
The findings are worth noting not only because the award is costless and has no material implications for the recipients, but also because it is given to newcomers who operate under only recently adopted pseudonyms. The estimates are conservative since non-responsiveness to the intervention may be due to two causes: Indifference, but also unawareness since some recipients simply do not (or only belatedly) return to their user page and thus do not see that they won an award (see, e.g., Panciera, Halfaker, and Terveen 2009, 55, and Morgan et al. 2013, 5) .
The analysis focuses on the treatment's effect on newcomer retention and leaves aside possible spill-over effects of the award. Some recipients have for instance written messages to other, more tenured editors, stating for example: "(...) I want to thank you most warmly since I would not have succeeded [in writing my first article] without your help. As such, a petal of the edelweiss belongs to you; just choose one" (author's translation).
While this suggests that the award's beneficial impact may exceed the effects found in this analysis, two limitations have to be pointed out. Firstly, the value of awards hinges on them being rare; they have to be used sparingly to prevent inflationary tendencies. Awards should therefore be integrated into a broader reward scheme to increase retention rates. It is an interesting topic for future research to explore the relationship between the value of an award and the quantity and frequency with which it is bestowed. Varying other award parameters, such as the degree of publicity, would be of no less interest.
Secondly, the experiment is conducted in an anonymous online context. As stated by Zhu (2011, 1613) , it is an interesting question for future research to examine the findings' generalizability to non-virtual fields and other public goods contexts. At the same time, however, the results as such are already important given the increasing Internet penetration of the professional and private spheres. The finding that anonymous newcomers to an online community are motivated by social recognition, the experience of competency, self-confidence and attention is important and should receive further attention by researchers. It might inform policies dealing with anonymity and its impacts on individual behavior.
Fostering Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good
A Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment at Wikipedia 
ONLINE APPENDIX B --THE AWARD
The design of the award page was modeled on that of the Swiss national portal, the banner of which is prominently displayed on top of the website.
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The award and a link to its page also figure on the front of the Portal Switzerland page. The text on the award page briefly describes the award and the idea behind it, of course without giving any details on performance criteria other than the condition that the editor has made the first contribution to the German Wikipedia in the previous month (whereby "contribution" is not defined). The aim of the award is declared, i.e. "to honor new users [editors] and their precious contributions to the German Wikipedia. They deserve our thanks and recognition." The names of some of the team members are provided for questions, suggestions or criticism. The page then displays the month's lists of recipients of the 1, 2 and 3 Star awards, as well as a link to the lists of former recipients (similar to a "hall of fame"). On the bottom of the page, a small template (called "Babel") that was created by a recipient of the first wave is offered for those interested to copy and put it onto their personal user page. 
ONLINE APPENDIX C TABLE C1 -RANDOMIZATION CHECK
Ordinal variable: Level of activity.
TABLE C2 -EFFECT ON LEVEL OF ACTIVITY
1st month after awarding date. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
